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MONEY TALK: AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALIZING
(COMMERCIAL) SPEECH
Allan C. Hutchinsont
For with names the world was called
Out of the empty air,
With names was built and walled,
Line and circle and square,
Dust and emerald,
Snatched from deceiving death,
By the articulate breath.
Edwin Muir
As seems fitting, the debate over free speech is one of the most
heated and intense on the academic and political agenda. The
topical problems of pornography, hate literature, election-
campaign financing and freedom of information attest not only to
the importance of these exchanges, but also to the confusion and
indirection of the different contributions. Like moths drawn to the
light, legal theorists have been irresistibly attracted to the bright
beacon of free speech; the literature on the American First
Amendment is truly enormous. The challenge and ambition is as
worthy as it is important - to ensure democracy's fragile flame is
kept aglow so that its ennobling light can suffuse and enhance the
practices and possibilities of social and political life. However, like
their lepidopteral counterparts, most writers on free speech have
found its attraction to be fatal. Despite a plethora of different
approaches, they have been unable to solve its mysteries or
fathom its secrets.
In this essay, I will tempt fate and tackle the perplexing problem
of "free speech". To do this, however, it is necessary to engage in
t Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University and Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Toronto. This paper is a greatly edited and substantially revised
version of "Talking the Good Life: From Free Speech to Democratic Dialogue" (1989), 1
Yale J. of Law and Liberation 17. Since writing that essay, I have been persuaded that my
position on the constitutional protection of speech rights is fatally flawed. Accordingly,
this paper reaches a very different conclusion on that important topic. I am especially
grateful to Michael Trebilcock and Stephen Waddams who, in an effort to save me from
myself, threw me a political lifebelt. Although I initially saw it as a noose and spurned its
possible use, I now see that their helping hand saved me from a watery jurisprudential
grave and allowed me to return to drier and firmer political ground. That said, there is no
reason to think that my new territorial home is a place where they would want to take up
academic residence (or even vacation there). Andrew Petter remains an important
influence. Many thanks to them.
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a thorough critique of the existing understandings of free speech in
a liberal society. After demonstrating their ideological instability
and limited operational efficacy, I will suggest an alternative way
of thinking about free speech and achieving a truly democratic
politics. Throughout the essay, my aim is to understand better the
present so as to make attempts at transformation more informed
and viable; "how little do we know that which we are, How less
what we may be. "I In pursuing this tack, I will be guided by the co-
ordinates of power and value: the need to ensure that everyone
can participate as equals in the constitutive dialogue of democratic
politics and an accompanying concern with the substantive worth
of the ensuing debate. It is a matter of the quality of the dialogue
as well as the quantity of it.
To illustrate the practical bite of this dialogic approach, I will
offer a rudimentary analysis of "commercial speech". The limited
aim of that inquiry is to show that there are convincing and
concrete recommendations entailed and required by my general
theory of democratic dialogism; the gap between the feminist
critique of Dale Spender and the control of shopping centres or
the semiotic insights of Umberto Eco and the regulation of
television advertising can be bridged by the dialogic theory itself.
In particular, as part of a more ambitious jurisprudential project,
2
I maintain that the courts are an inappropriate agency to which to
entrust the democratic responsibility of creating and protecting
dialogic practices: judges are not the guardians of democratic
politics, but some of its primary usurpers.
1. Liberal Foundations
In all its different threads and strands, 3 the contemporary
tapestry of free speech draws on a very inadequate set of premises
and assumptions; it has an impoverished view of human person-
ality and language and, most importantly, the crucial relation
between the two. As part of the more general liberal theory of
freedom, the approach to free speech is premised on a social world
compromising an aggregation of distinct individuals with a set of
pre-social preferences and values. Social interaction provides
I Lord Byron, Don Juan (1824), Chapter xv, st. 99.
2 See A. Hutchinson, Dwelling on The Threshold (1988) and Radical Romance: A Non-
Foundational Account of Laws and Politics (forthcoming, 1991).
3 See E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (1985), pp. 8-23.
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opportunities to satisfy better their given preferences and to
achieve a desirable level of self-fulfillment: shared values are a
possible product of a just society, but not a condition for its
existence. 4 Within liberal society, language is understood as a
neutral medium that is available to all and that stands indepen-
dently of the ideas and world it is intended to convey or depict; it is
the postal carrier delivering a letter or the librarian handing out a
book.5 In its various renderings, the liberal objective is to facilitate
this intellectual economy of exchange and to enhance individual
choice and self-determination. Consequently, the pillars of liberal
free speech are the private individual with "different and indeed
incommensurable and irreconcilable conceptions of the good
' 6
and the transparency of language as a public medium through
which to communicate them.
Apart from the naive failure of most scholars to recognize its
scope for domination, the liberal view fails to take language
seriously and presents a falsely dichotomous view of the world.
For the modern Liberal, the challenge is to steer a middle course
between the extreme images of an heroic Rodinesque individual
and an overbearing Stalinesque state; people must stand free and
alone or else risk being enslaved to a hostile community. Emanci-
pation is suspended in the space between a public instrumentalism
and an esoteric privatism. Of course, liberal theory ceaselessly
vacillates in this posture and is forever seeking to mediate the
competing influences of the government as threat to and guarantor
of individual freedom. 7 Unfortunately, while discursive sociali-
zation or indoctrination is almost inevitable, it is not uniquely
attributable to the actions of the government. Power is not the sole
preserve of the government, but is distributed among an elite
corporate sector. 8 To check the abuse of dialogic power, there
must be a critical shift of analysis from its sources and quantity to
its consequences and quality.
" See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1978), p. 578 and T. Emerson, The System of
Freedom of Expression (1979), pp. 6-7. For a "sophisticated" example of the pre-formed
liberal individual, see R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1984), pp. 181-204.
5 See T. Hobbes, Leviathan, C.B. MacPherson, ed. (1968), p. 101 and J. Locke, An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, A. Pringle-Pattison, ed. (1924), Book 3, Chapter 2.
6 Rawls, "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" in Liberty, Equality and Law, S.
McMurrin, ed. (1987), at p. 17.
7 See Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" (1979), 28 Buff. L. Rev.
205.
8 See Hutchinson, "Mice Under A Chair: Democracy, Courts and the Administrative
State" (1990), 39 U.T.L.J. (forthcoming).
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For instance, liberals seem to adopt simultaneously the contra-
dictory positions that language can be a neutral conduit in which
speakers can fully and freely express themselves and also that
language can be a potent vehicle for the indoctrination of some
speakers by others. Yet, the particular stance adopted will usually
depend upon the identity of the speaker. When spoken by self-
possessed individuals, language will be considered a transparent
medium; when uttered by government, it will more often be
treated as a suspect tool. The reality is more nuanced and less
polarized. Whereas government is occasionally the voice of the
muted many against the voluble few, monied voices often speak in
the language of dissemblance. In its own lumbering fashion, of
course, liberalism is struggling to come to terms with the non-
essential nature of language and its potential for both education
and obfuscation. But, by adopting its particular stance, liberals are
unable to grasp the dialectical and dialogic nature of individual
identity and social action. Social reality, language and intention-
ality converge and conflict in mutually sustaining and transforming
patterns.
Language is not a transparency through which the world is
observed nor a catalogue of labels to be attached to the appro-
priate contents of the world. There is no form of pure communi-
cation that merely represents instead of creating. The world is
within the language and the language within the world. Language
is a social medium. It shapes society and its individuals as they
work to reshape it. No one is free to describe the world as they
wish; they are always and already constrained by the prevailing
ways of speaking. As such, discourse is as much constitutive of
reality, both personal and collective, as it is constituted by that
society. It is a cultural and political artefact of the first order "in
the sense that it serves to constitute an authority structure". 9 The
world cannot speak for itself; it must be spoken for. Social reality
is constantly being negotiated and constructed, renegotiated and
reconstructed. Language is not a system of static symbols, but is a
form of social action and history-making. To acquire and exercise
a language is to engage in the most profound of political acts. As
much feminist literature shows, to name the world is to control it."°
9 J.G.A. Pocock, Politics, Language and Time (1973), p. 15. See, also, Peller, "The
Metaphysics of American Law" (1985), 73 Cal. L. Rev. 1181. This insight is not new, but
the older view did not pursue the politics of social construction through discourse. See
B.L. Whorf, Language, Thought and Reality, J. Carroll, ed. (1956).
10 See, for example, D. Spender, Man-Made Language (1982).
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Law manages to impose a largely masculinist construction on
social life and thereby silences and marginalizes alternative ways
of understanding and being in the world. As a particular mode of
authoritative discourse, law inscribes its intrinsic values on the
world.11
2. A Public Problem
A particular villain of the liberal piece is the cherished and
foundational distinction between public and private. A pseudo-
Blackstonian set of individual rights is imagined that must be
protected, preserved and promoted. An injustice occurs when the
state, or someone acting through or on behalf of the government,
interferes with or fails to protect such entitlements; there is little
empirical or ideological analysis into the actual quality of those
rights and their exercise. Instead, the courts engage in an
analytical inquiry as to whether the government was involved or
not. If it was, remedial intervention through the courts is
warranted; if not, those affected must lobby for political repara-
tions. The emphasis is upon whether the impugned act can be
identified with the formal attributes of governmental authority
and not upon whether it has actually inhibited or damaged the
interests of particular citizens. Pedigree and form are the
standards for evaluating impermissible behaviour rather than
effect and substance. As the American Supreme Court put it in
1982, "careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement
preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of
federal law and federal judicial power ... [and] whether this is
good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political
order."12
The first critical thing to note is that the government is impli-
cated in all activity that occurs within its territorial jurisdiction. Its
claim to sovereignty means that an active decision not to intervene
and regulate, or mere inaction, is as much governmental responsi-
bility as an active decision to do so. Although we only perceive
t' See Finley, "Breaking Women's Silence - What Language Can We Use?" (1989), 64
Notre Dame L. Rev. 886.
12 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) at pp. 936-7. The Canadian scheme of
things is not exactly the same. See Hutchinson, supra, footnote 8. However, in post-
Charter days, this American self-image of the state and the propriety of state activity is
taking a firmer grip on the Canadian ideological imagination. See infra, at pp. 9-10.
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efforts to change the status quo as involving the government, the
retention of an existing situation is as much due to the efforts and
actions of the state. Acquiescence and action are merely flip-sides
of the governmental coin. 13 The protection of private property and
the enforcement of private contracts by the government ensures
that it has a strong and necessary presence in private
transactions. 14 The plea by free-marketeers and their ilk that
government should stay out of citizens' lives - that the state that
governs least is the state that governs best - is as contradictory as
it is disingenuous. The market is one instrument of central
planning; it is not an absence of constraints, but a particular set of
state-sanctioned constraints.15 Property and contract are creatures
of the state and support for these allocative regimes is neither
more nor less politically neutral and activist than opposition to
them. It is not a question of whether government should
intervene, but when and how it should regulate the affairs of its
constituent citizens.
The efforts by American courts to administer this central but
illusory public-private distinction are predictably troubled and
troubling. Two examples will have to suffice. It is widely acknowl-
edged that "[s]o far as the Constitution goes, a private person may
engage in any discrimination he wants."' 16 Constitutional impera-
tives only apply to state actions. In free speech doctrine, this has
led to two pressing questions: the extent to which the state can
refuse to make its own facilities available to the public for speech
purposes (when can the state act as a private body?) and the extent
to which private persons must allow their property to be used by
the public for speech purposes (when must a private person be
treated like the state?). In the first instance, while the courts have
held that traditional forums like streets and parks are available for
speech purposes, 17 they have tried to develop a "public forum"
13 This insight was explicitly recognized by even the American courts almost 60 years ago,
but they have failed to act on it. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). Since then, it
seems to have been conveniently and selectively overlooked. The modem ramifications
of this insight for constitutional and administrative law are fully developed in Hutchinson
and Petter, "Private Rights and Public Wrongs: The Liberal Lie of the Charter" (1988),
38 U.T.L.J. 278.
14 See Hale, "Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State" (1923), 38
Pol. Sci. Q. 470 and Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty" (1927), 13 Cor. L.Q. 8.
15 See C. Lindblom, Politics and Markets (1977), pp. 93-106.
16 Minnick v. California Department of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981) at p. 128, per
Stewart J.
17 Hague v. C. L 0., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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doctrine that gives limited access to public property where the
exercise of speech rights is compatible with normal activity at
normal times.18 The resulting doctrine is a bewildering amalgam of
half-distinctions and semi-similarities: courts gravitate between
generous and narrow interpretations of so-called public forums. 19
The difficulty has primarily flowed from the courts' insistence
that "the [government], no less than a private owner of property,
has power to preserve the property under its control for use to
which it is lawfully dedicated." 20 This means, of course, that the
government's obligations depend upon what the powers of a
private property owner are. As the relevant doctrine shows, this
turns into a circular argument. The powers of private property
owners are determined by the extent to which property is being
used for public purposes or not; government property being used
for non-public purposes can be regulated in line with the powers of
private property owners. In short, each is defined and determined
in terms of the other. Doctrinal intelligibility and determinacy are
perennially elusive: knowledge of the availability of public
property for speech activities is conditional on the unavailability of
private property for speech activities which is itself dependent on
the availability of public property and vice versa. Definitional
closure is only attainable, even temporarily, by constant acts of
dissemblance and obfuscation.
Despite the American courts' vaunted reverence for the
protection of speech rights, they have only tended to enforce them
outside private property: it "would be an unwarranted
infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the
exercise of first amendment rights". 21 Nevertheless, in some
circumstances, private property has been treated as being publicly
held and, therefore, amenable to the exercise of speech rights.
18 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
19 See United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114
(1981); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1982);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985). For a
strong critique of these doctrinal developments and their earlier history, see L. Tribe,
Constitutional Choices (1985), pp. 204-10 and Cass, "First Amendment Access to
Government Facilities" (1979), 65 Va. L. Rev. 1287. For an account of how categories
like "public forum" and "non-public forum" can be manipulated to serve differing objec-
tives and interests, see Dienes, "The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First
Amendment Analysis" (1986), 55 G.W.L. Rev. 109.
20 Adderley v. Florida, 398 U.S. 39 (1966), per Black J.
21 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), at p. 567.
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This, of course, does not dispose of the constitutional question,
but redirects attention to those considerations that are relevant in
the "public" sphere. As expected though, the public-private
distinction has proved thoroughly unequal to the task either as a
general analytical tool or as an ideological screen. As with the
"public forum" doctrine, the courts have vacillated in their
willingness to turn private property into public property. This is
especially evident in dealing with shopping centers, where the
confusion of legal doctrine is regularly reaffirmed in futile efforts
by the courts to whip it into intelligible or determinate shape.
22
Rather than grasp the political nettle by discarding the public-
private distinction, the courts continue to reach substantive
answers by asking analytical questions. Unmindful of American
-doctrine's congenital incoherence, Canadian courts seem almost
enthusiastic to emulate the judicial efforts of their southern neigh-
bours. In the leading case, the Supreme Court accepted that
picketing could be a protected form of expression, but held that
private employers fell outside the reach of the Charter. 23 Further,
even where government property is involved, the courts contrive
to engage in an American-style balancing process under cover of
the Charter's s. 1.24 However, whichever analytical approach is
followed, social facts intrude on such a conceptual exercise. For
instance, it takes little reflection to realize that the opportunity to
use shopping centers to distribute information or ideas is a more
effective exercise of speech than standing on a street corner. Being
a relatively inexpensive way of reaching large numbers of people,
the prohibition of such access works an unequal disadvantage to
the poor: the wealthy can avail themselves of other arguably more
intrusive mediums - beaming T.V. messages directly into
people's homes. Also, it must be remembered that government
property is the only property to which many people have access.
Consequently, any curtailment of speech activities on such
22 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra, footnote 21; Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Pruneyard Shopping Centre v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1981).
For a thorough-going critique of these cases, see Kairys, "Legal Reasoning" in The
Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, D. Kairys, ed. (1982), at pp. 1-9.
23 See RWDSU, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd. (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174, [1986] 2
S.C.R. 573.24 See Comitif pour la Rdpublique du Canada v. Committee For the Commonwealth of
Canada (1987), 36 D.L.R. (4th) 501, [198712 F.C. 68 (F.C.A.).
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property has a disproportionately negative impact on the poor and
their capacity to engage in public debate. 25
3. The Liberal Impasse
Modem scholars are belatedly becoming aware of the short-
comings of liberal theorizing. In particular, they have found it
hard to ignore the all-too-cozy relation between politics and
economics; franchise and finance are seen to be increasingly
mutually dependent and reinforcing. The libertarian Tradition
was developed to act as a citizen's shield against the slings and
arrows of state censorship, especially those which were targeted at
the content of certain speech. Yet, in a modem hi-tech world in
which the paradigmatic speaker is CBS rather than the street
comer orator, any continued reliance on that outmoded Tradition
will not only fail to protect democratic politics, but runs the
considerable risk of impairing it. Each citizen's medieval shield
offers little defence against the expensive and communicative
subtleties of technological weaponry: the journey from the
soapbox to the V.C.R. has altered much on the socio-cultural
landscape. Contemporary conditions require the development
and deployment of a collective laser. The pressing problem for
modem liberals is to explain and justify under what circumstances
the state is obliged or entitled to regulate the activities of
particular speakers.
A progressive effort to move beyond the Free Speech Tradition,
while remaining within the liberal paradigm, is made by Owen
Fiss. 26 He advocates and defends a more interventionist role for
the state. By focusing more on the structure of social arrange-
ments than on the action of particular individuals, he wants to shift
critical attention away from "the frustration of would-be
speakers" and towards "the quality of public debate". 27 Within
such a structural scheme, the government would cease to be the
worst enemy of free speech, but would become, at least on
occasion, its best friend. Instead of leaving politics to the capital
caprices of a market economy, Fiss would permit and sometimes
25 For a development of this theme, see Hutchinson and Jones, "Wheeler-Dealing: An
Essay on Law, Politics and Speech" (1988), 15 J. Law & Soc. 263.
26 "Why The State?" (1987), 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781 ("State") and "Free Speech and Social
Structure" (1986), 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 ("Speech").
27 State, supra, footnote 26, at p. 786.
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require the state to correct and chastise it; the market would
become the butler of democracy and not its master. The denial of
expressive autonomy to the loud few would be adequately
compensated by the broader benefits to the presently silenced
many. Instead of allowing the invisible hand of the market to
orchestrate the social symphony (cacophony?), the democratic
arm of the state would assume the communal baton. In short, Fiss
wants to turn around the U.S. Supreme Court's standard view that
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."28
The impetus for much of his work comes from a genuine desire
to rectify this state of socio-legal affairs and to guarantee that
people possess real, and not simply abstract, freedom and
equality. 29 He is insistent that, by ignoring the pervasive impact of
private power on individual citizens and concentrating on abuses
of public power, constitutional lawyers contrive to insulate vast
sectors of the social hierarchy from official scrutiny and eradi-
cation. The constructive consequence of Fiss' critique is the
recommendation that constitutional norms ought to apply to all
facets of American life; private bureaucracies must not be allowed
to hold the democratic community to political ransom. Yet Fiss'
efforts at reconstruction reveal the limits and failings of the liberal
vision of democratic politics. It lacks an adequate or satisfactory
social theory; it fails to acknowledge or understand the extent to
which individuals are deeply formed and shaped by their social
milieu. Although the boundaries are less analytically sharp and
more historically permeable than was traditionally thought to be
the case, the distinction between the public and private spheres
remains at the heart of the liberal understanding of social life.
For liberals, talking about the possibility of a private self that
stands, in some essential and constitutive sense, independent of its
social and historical circumstances is both achievable and
desirable. Indeed, it is the chief idea that gives meaning and point
to the liberal project. Yet, they fail to appreciate the full implica-
tions of their attachments and proposals; they prove too much for
28 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at pp. 48-9. Fiss' suggestion that "state regulation of speech
is consistent with, and may even be required by, the First amendment" is surely a strategic
rather than an historical claim. State, supra, footnote 26, at p. 783, emphasis added.
29 See Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" (1976), 5 J. Phil. & Pub. Affs. 107.
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their own liberal good. Without some notional sphere of private
autonomy to be preserved from the intrusions of others, whether it
be the government or other entities, the constitutional protection
of rights and freedoms through judicial review is drained of
meaning and legitimacy. They are thrown on to the horns of a
painful dilemma. Unless they develop a substantive vision of
distributive justice, no template will exist against which to
measure the social value of any particular act or state of affairs.
Without such a measure, there is only a desultory ad-hockery.
However, if such a vision is developed, they will have abandoned
their self-confessed commitment to liberalism and its neutrality
toward substantive theories of communal good. 30
For instance, in the archetypal dispute between the person who
wants to use property to speak, pamphleteer or picket and the
property owner who wants to exclude such activities, liberals
resort to the spurious rhetoric of individual rights. Yet, lacking the
mythical support of a public-private distinction, any efforts to
reach coherent or convincing resolutions of competing claims by
individuals become impossible without addressing the deep and
disturbing normative difficulties that such disputes raise. Rights
talk only masks these choices; it cannot resolve them.31 The
competing claims of speaker and property owner can be framed in
terms of rights, but their resolution will always depend upon an
inextricable combination of constitutional principle and political
power. A serious effort to confront this difficult conjunction
demands a thorough reassessment of society's deepest commit-
ments and operative assumptions. While these questions do not
lend themselves to easy answers under any theory or practice of
social justice, liberalism provides no theoretical framework for
even understanding, let alone resolving, distributional issues of
this kind. It requires the very conception of substantive good that
it so proudly eschews, but so badly needs.
30 A related dificulty is that any move in this non-liberal direction would oblige Fiss to
accept the impossibility of a neutral or objective mode of constitutional adjudication.
Without clearly defined realms of public and private activity, the traditional knit of
constitutional rights starts to unravel. Constitutional law will come to consist of claims
about the appropriate allocation of state powers and social resources among citizens. In
this revised understanding, neutrality ceases to be a plausible characteristic or attainable
goal of judicial review. See Hutchinson and Petter, supra, footnote 13.
31 See Hutchinson and Monahan, "The 'Rights' Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond" (1984),
62 Texas L. Rev. 1477, and Hutchinson and Petter, "Rights in Conflict: The Dilemma of
Charter Legitimacy" (1989), 23 U.B.C.L. Rev. 531.
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No amount of tinkering with the liberal project will suffice in
completing this substantive undertaking: it is the very liberal
structure of social practice and organization that prevents a
successful resolution of the free speech problem. Although there
is much trumpeting to the contrary, democracy has always been
optional to a liberal scheme of democratic governance rather than
its pre-condition and raison d'6tre.32 Each person is primarily a
rights-holder; their identity as members of a social group and as
citizens in a common and democratic enterprise is secondary.
However, notwithstanding liberals' protestations, it is only by
recognizing the need to nourish a genuine experience of shared
commitments and mutual understandings - the very antithesis of
liberal values - that they could make good on their critical
promise. Paradoxically, it would seem that liberals must abandon
liberalism if they want to meet successfully the modem challenge
that liberalism has set for itself. The progressive quest is to wrest
theory and practice from the grip of a paralyzing liberalism
without falling into the embrace of a suffocating communitar-
ianism.
4. Commercial Speech
The debate over the constitutionality of restricting commercial
speech has long occupied the energy and imagination of United
States jurists. 33 More importantly, it is a paradigmatic example of
the fatal failings of the liberal approach to free speech and liberals'
insistence on entrusting its protection to the courts. The issue
received the first contribution from the Supreme Court of Canada
in a recent decision under the new Charter of Rights. The compli-
cated and volatile case of Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General),34
involved a challenge by shopkeepers to Quebec legislation that
required all signs and advertising to be in French only. The
Supreme Court struck down the legislation as offending the
Charter's guarantee, in s. 2(b), that "everyone has ... freedom of
thought, belief, opinion and expression". However, it held that,
under the limiting provision of s. 1, it would be acceptable to
require that all signs be in French, albeit not exclusively so, and
32 See Hutchinson and Monahan, "Democracy and The Rule of Law" in The Rule of Law:
Ideal or Ideology, A. Hutchinson and P. Monahan, eds. (1987), at p. 97.
33 See, for example, L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (1988), pp. 890-904.
34 (1988), 54 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
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that French be more prominent than any other language. The
province refused to accept this apparent compromise. It legislated
that all outside signs must be in French only, but that bilingual
signs would be acceptable inside premises. Quebec exercised its
right under s. 33 of the Charter to exempt the legislation from
constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court recognized as a general principle that
language was not merely a medium of expression: it was a "means
by which a people may express its cultural identity ... [and] by
which the individual expresses his or her personal identity and
sense of individuality." ' 35 Explicitly following U.S.
jurisprudence, 36 the court concluded that, as commercial speech
"plays a significant role in enabling individuals to make informed
economic choices, an important aspect of individual self-
fulfillment and personal autonomy", it deserved constitutional
protection. 37 As such, Ford offers an excellent focus for the decon-
structive critique of liberal democracy and its limited recon-
structive and transformative potential. The matters alluded to by
the court - the constitutive character of language and the impor-
tance of informed choice - are indeed crucial elements in a
democratic society and must be treated with solicitous attention.
Yet, for these very same reasons, commercial speech is thoroughly
undeserving of constitutional protection and should be democrati-
cally regulated. By according it a privileged status in the public
discourse of democratic society, courts jeopardize the likelihood
of informed choice and the enhancement of individual identity and
encourage the dilution of language as a form of social action. It
must be recognized that the quality of public discourse intimately
shapes individual choice, as well as the shared meanings which
protect people from that manipulation of language or expose them
to its worst abuses.
A famous Bill no doubt captured the spirit of the sixteenth
century: "All the world's a stage, And all the men and women
merely players. '38 But, today, a different Bill has become the
35 Ibid., at p. 604.
36 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976), and Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com'n of New
York.447 U.S. 557 (1980).
37 Supra, footnote 34, at p. 618. Ironically, this comes at a time when the U.S. courts might
well be considering something of a retreat on their constitutional commitment to the
protection of commercial speech. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.
of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
38 W. Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, sc. vii.
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contemporary bard - Billboard. All the world of the late
twentieth century is an advertisement and all the men and women
merely consumers in the sprawling marketplace; life mimics
advertisements. It is not simply that there is a barrage of infor-
mation and images on how we should look, act, eat and think, but
that advertising represents a cumulative projection of a particular
definition of reality and vision of "the good life": "Coke - Taste
The Feeling" or "Simpson's is The Store For Your Life". Adver-
tising does not so much concern the product being marketed as the
molding of the product's targeted consumer in the advertisers'
image; it is not what is right about the product, but what is wrong
with the buyer.
39
The effect of such a commercially saturated atmosphere is to
trivialize and impoverish democratic politics. Public discourse
becomes hostage to economics and begins to dance to, instead of
call, the economic tune: it is thoroughly infiltrated by the
economic mind-set and attuned to its interests. People think of
themselves primarily as consumers rather than citizens. The
middle-class weaknesses of ostentation and envy are exploited;
Yuppiedom becomes its own political credo and lifestyle. Under
the aegis of advertising, electoral politics is eviscerated and
reduced to a hollow spectacle; form triumphs over substance by
converting it into its own empty reflection. As the package has
become more significant than the product, so politicians' images
are more important than their ideas. Campaigns are designed to
exude credibility in which postures of leadership are mistaken for
leadership. Rhetoric replaces vision and slogans act as a surrogate
for debate; there is no real discussion as to the substantive merits
of any proposed programme. As in advertisements, so in politics
- the glib not only succeed over the good, but the medium
ensures that only the photogenic take part. The message (and the
massage) is the medium. 4°
39 N. Postman, Amusing Ourselves To Death (1985), p. 128. This is an insistent theme in
much sociological literature. See, for example, S. Ewen and E. Ewen, Channels of
Desire: Mass Images and the Shaping of American Consciousness (1982) and R. Williams,
Problems in Materialism and Culture (1980).
40 See S. Ewen, All Consuming Images: the Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture
(1988). The impact of the mass media in shaping the political process in the image of
commercial consumption is well documented. See, for example, D. Lazert, ed.,
American Media and Mass Culture: Left Perspectives (1987) and E. Herman and N.
Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (1988). An
early citing of the commercial packaging of politics is T. White, The Selling of the
President (1964).
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For the most part, commercial speech comes from corporations;
and the current legal system protects corporate commercial
speech through the fictions that corporations are people and that
corporations are private. People speak, corporations do not; they
are the artificial mouthpieces of accumulated power. As Wallace
Stevens put it, "To say more than humans with a human voice/
That cannot be: to say human things with more than human voice,
that also cannot be;/ To speak humanly from the height or depth of
human things, that is acutest speech. 41 The general extension of
constitutional rights to corporations underscores the constitutive
relation between discourse, identity and social reality; corpora-
tions only acquire a meaningful existence and identity within the
language of law. They exist only by dint of the legal imagination.
Through the sanctioning by Ford and its predecessors of the idea
that economic fictions are rights-carrying entities at least as
deserving of protection and concern as human beings, law consti-
tutes a particular social and normative reality.
Under the aegis of the public-private distinction, corporations
are treated as private actors, separate from and in opposition to
the state .42 The major effects of this traditional way of thinking are
twofold. By treating corporations as separate from the State, it
overlooks the important influence that corporations exert over
government policy and the economy through lobbying, campaign
financing, agency capture, media control, shared personnel and
economic pressure. 43 Also by positing corporations as having a
similar status as citizens, it ignores the exercise of enormous power
by corporations over the lives of citizens. From McDonald's to
General Motors and Sears to CBS, corporations are the primary
loci for socio-economic decisions and policy-making; how we put
food on the table, what food we put on the table, what we pay to
put food on the table, what food we think we should put on the
table and whether we put food on the table are all questions, for
instance, that are shaped by corporations. Each effect combines to
insulate corporations from democratic regulation, ensuring that
large sections of the ruling elite will remain beyond the reach of
popular control and the grasp of electoral accountability. Corpo-
41 W. Stevens, "From Chocura to its Neighbours" in The Palm at the End of the Mind
(1974),p. 245.
42 See Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 and First
National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
43 For a fuller account of this situation, see Hutchinson, supra, footnote 8.
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rations are the favoured and bastard offspring of liberals'
attachment to the public-private distinction.
In a social world in which the connection between commerce
and communication is particularly intimate, the continued privi-
leged status granted to corporate bodies by the state makes the
state responsible for the disproportionate impact of corporate
speech on social life and politics. Commercial speech is more
about commerce than it is about speech and more about profits
than people. While the wealthy are as democratically worthy of a
political hearing as any other, their views are undeserving of any
greater airing; the challenge is to limit rather than underwrite the
impact of economic equality on public debate. The state cannot
claim that its refusal to regulate is a neutral act. Corporations are
creatures of the state and any redistributive consequences attrib-
utable to corporate activity implicate the state. It is only very
rarely that corporations will act as agents of social liberation.
Through corporations' willingness and ability to monopolize the
technology of influence, the state is inextricably involved in the
distribution of social power and the quality of political debate. It is
not only a major player in the crucial game of influence-peddling,
but its success or failure affects the lives of the many citizens on
whose behalf it plays. The state and its citizens are bound to lose, if
the state persists in pretending it is only an umpire or spectator.
Mindful of the overwhelming presence and volume of corporate
expression in contemporary society, the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Ford effectively constitutionalizes the corporate
strategy to (re)constitute life in the impoverished image of the
commercial imagination. 44 If economic choices are so important,
why would advertising be left to the discretion of those who stand
to benefit most from a partial disclosure of information. Any
putative "right to know" is surely better policed by the citizenry
than by its potential transgressors. Moreover, if the speech
44 See Re Rocket and Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th)
641, 64 0. R. (2d) 353 at p. 376, per Cory J.A. and Re Klein and Law Society of Upper
Canada: Re Dvorak and Law Society of Upper Canada (1985), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 489, 50
O.R. (2d) 118 (H.C.J.). These "advances" in the protection of corporate rights and
freedoms are put in critical context when set against the treatment of unions. Whereas
corporations are deemed worthy of constitutional recognition, the labour movement has
received short shrift from the courts. See Reference re Public Service Employee Relations
Act, Labour Relations Act and Police Officers Collective Bargaining Act (1987), 38
D.L.R. (4th) 161, [198711 S.C.R. 313 and Petter, "The Politics of the Charter" (1986), 8
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 473.
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privilege is said to include the right not to speak as well as to speak
freely, the implications for commercial communication by
manufacturers and entrepreneurs are enormous. They will be
empowered to resist all but the most modest and uncontroversial
requests for the publication of basic production information.
Commercial speech, in the sense of disseminating information
about products, is not a bad thing per se. A large quantity and high
quality of such advertising will likely be a vital feature of a
democratic society and economy. The crucial issue is who or what
is to regulate and monitor such activity - the citizenry and
consumers at large, through various legislative measures and
regulative agencies, or the commercial sector of the economy in
the name of the market? A commitment to dialogue has an
obvious and clear preference: the regulation of commercial speech
must be placed firmly in the hands of the democratic process and
not placed beyond their reach by the courts in the name of consti-
tutional wisdom. The argument for reduced protection through a
lower level of judicial scrutiny is only a small, but insufficient
concession. 45 This approach still gives corporations an unwar-
ranted insulation from democratic regulation. The force of my
proposal is not necessarily to ban commercial speech, but to give it
no special weight in democratic calculations of social justice. To
do otherwise is to elevate the pursuit of profit to a much more
dignified status than it deserves and to give the views of the
wealthy too great a say in public affairs. Without such a bold step
towards legislative regulation, the commitment to attaining a truly
substantive practice of democratic dialogue will be stillborn.
Of course, to deny constitutional protection to corporations
does not dispense entirely with the problem of commercial speech:
monied persons as well as corporations can advertise.
46
Furthermore, it is insufficient to target the type of speech as well as
the identity of the speaker: the attempt to draw such distinctions is
as-futile as it is impractical. 47 The only viable solution - and one
that is demanded by both ideological and strategic considerations
- is to abandon the whole endeavour to grant a spurious constitu-
45 See Sharpe, "Commercial Expression and The Charter" (1987), 37 U. T. L. J. 229 and
Braun, "Should Commercial Speech Be Accorded Prima Facie Constitutional Recog-
nition Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?" (1986), 18 Ottawa L. Rev.
37.
46 See, for example, Buckley, supra, footnote 28 and Belloti, supra, footnote 42.
47 For example, see supra, pp. 7-10.
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tional privilege to particular rights, including and especially those
to free speech. In short, the progressive task is to revoke the
Charter or, at least, its interpretation by the judiciary. Without
such a bold step, the commitment to attaining a truly substantive
practice of democratic politics will be stillborn; corporations will
devise strategies to circumvent more limited arrangements.
These conclusions are likely anathema to the liberal estab-
lishment, but they are essential to the move toward an egalitarian
democracy. The constitutional protection of commercial speech
and speech generally through the institution of judicial review
frustrates rather than enhances democratic dialogue, individual
freedom and social enrichment. It threatens to realize a state of
affairs in which corporate "tyrants indulge in monologues over
millions of solitudes. '48 Information is a two-edged sword and
more is not always better; quality is more important than quantity.
In today's social world, it is the commercial dilution of public
discourse to a distracting and anodyne patter that is as much a
threat as Big Brother. Citizens are choking on a commercial glut
of inconsequential information rather than starving on a
constrained diet of official misinformation. It is only necessary to
ration the supply of ideas and facts when people still retain the
crucial capacity to be selective and care enough to exercise it. The
most effective censorship occurs through the dulling or triviali-
zation of that cognitive process of discrimination. 49 By granting
constitutional immunity to commercial speech, we hasten this
demise of democratic politics and place social justice at the behest
of corporate boardrooms and other foyers of private power.
5. Kids' Play
Most commentators were supportive of the Supreme Court's
protection of commercial speech in Ford. It was seen as a triumph
for common sense and as obviating the need to engage in spurious
distinctions between protected and unprotected categories of
speech. Even those who had lingering doubts about the wisdom of
such a principle were reassured by the availability of the Charter's
s. 1 to place sensible limits on the right to commercial speech. In a
second decision that followed hard on the heels of Ford, the
48 A. Camus, Resistance, Rebellion and Death (1961), p. 104.
49 See Postman, supra, footnote 39, at pp. 138-41 and 155-63.
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commentators' confidence was seemingly vindicated. The
Supreme Court held that Quebec legislation which prohibited
television advertising to persons under 13 was not in contravention
of the Charter of Rights. 50 While commercial speech was
protected under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
communication, the particular legislation was saved by the fact
that, under the Charter's s. 1, protection of impressionable young
children from commercial manipulation is a pressing and
substantial concern that can be "demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society".
This is surely a decision that warrants strong popular approval
and that is defensible on broad grounds of public policy. It is
appropriate that the interests of the young have priority over those
of the corporate sector. Nevertheless, the court's holding is only
cause for muted celebration. Its immediate beneficial effects and
appeal are more than outweighed by its long-term problems and
institutional implications. The constitutional and political fact
remains that commercial speech and advertising is generally
beyond the reach of democratic supervision. Attempts to regulate
advertising in the name of social justice are now of the most
tenuous constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, the circumstances in
which the courts will protect such legislative interventions are
most unclear and elusive. So one cheer - but no more - for the
Supreme Court.
First of all, the decision in Irwin Toy was by a bare plurality of
only three to two. The views of the remaining members of the
court are unknown and only four of the five judges presently
remain on the court. Accordingly, the majority of existing
Supreme Court judges has yet to reveal their collective hand on
the matter - this state of affairs, of course, cuts both ways in any
academic debate over the future course of legal doctrine. Never-
theless, all the judges in Irwin Toy had little difficulty in finding
that advertising was not only a recognizable mode of expression,
but that its protection clearly fell within the ambit of the Charter's
s. 2. Whether assessed by purpose or effect, the disputed legis-
lation was considered to have made an unwarranted infringement
on the constitutional ability of Irwin Toy to advertise to whom and
how it wanted.
50 Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General) (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 927.
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Relying heavily on its decision in Ford, the court re-emphasized
its staunch commitment to the protection of expression as an indis-
pensable pillar in a democratic and pluralistic society. As a funda-
mental value to the community and the individual, free expression
is" 'little less vital to man's mind and spirit than breathing is to his
physical existence.' "51 Repeating at length that its vigilance and
solicitation for protecting free speech centres upon "individual
self-fulfillment and human flourishing", 52 whether as an end in
itself or a means to truth-finding and democratic participation, the
court managed to overlook the fact that Irwin Toy is not a human,
but only a human creation. It is a corporation and no more human
than the toys it makes: the only "flourishing" and "fulfillment" it
is concerned with is its own economic flourishing and financial
fulfillment. The ludicrous logic of such a fictitious argument would
seem to be that I.B.M. or Domtar should not only be able to vote,
but be candidates for Prime Minister (or is that the idea?).
The absurdity and injustice of treating an economic unit, such as
a corporation, as a human being and conferring constitutional
rights upon it is fully and pellucidly revealed, but not recognized
by the court itself. At the end of the majority's judgment, there is a
short digression on whether a corporation can invoke the
Charter's s. 7 "right to life, liberty and security of the person".
This was occasioned by the fact that the Quebec statute imposed
imprisonment and fines on violators. The court held that, while
officers of the corporation would be able to explore the possible
implications of such rights, the corporation itself would not. As
the court said, "it is nonsensical to speak of a corporation being
put in jail. '53 Indeed, it is. But it is no less nonsensical than to
speak of a corporation speaking! Furthermore, the court's reluc-
tance to read economic rights into s. 7 stands in stark contrast to its
solicitude for such rights under the guise of free speech. By
granting constitutional protection to commercial advertising, the
court failed to recognize that this is simply conferring economic
rights on corporations by another name. The right to advertise is
more about profits than it is about speech.
However, this blatant contradiction in reasoning does not close
51 Ibid., at pp. 606 and 635 (quoting Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.R. 285 at p. 306, per
Rand J.).
52 Ibid., at p. 612.
53 Ibid., at p. 632.
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the matter. The question remains whether the right to security of
the person extends to economic liberty. If it does, the directors
will be able to accomplish through economic liberty what a corpo-
ration could not through free speech: the constitutional denial of
corporate standing would be more apparent than real. The court
declared that, as a general rule, economic rights did not qualify for
Charter protection. But, and most importantly, it did leave open
the possibility that security of the person might include "rights to
social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food, clothing
and shelter". 54 The court held back on making any full
pronouncement on their constitutional existence and contented
itself with the conclusion that it would be "precipitous" and
premature to make a final determination. Although the court
seems to be closing out the possibility of directors being able to
claim commercial rights under s. 7, the Yogi Berra axiom is as
pertinent in law as it is in sport - "It ain't over 'til it's over."
55
While the court was unanimous on the issue of whether
commercial speech was worthy of constitutional protection, the
judges disagreed over the application of the s. 1 limitation.
Purporting to apply the same legal test,56 the judges divided over
the weight and cogency of the social facts put in evidence before
the court. The majority felt that sufficient evidence was led by the
Quebec government in support of justifiable intervention. It took
the view that, although there was a "high standard of justification"
on the government, 57 it had shown the existence of a pressing and
substantial objective (protection of vulnerable children from
commercial manipulation) and the proportionality of measures
taken to attain that objective (a complete ban on television adver-
tising). On the other hand, the minority was not convinced and
54 Ibid., at p. 633.
55 Although not technically on "commercial speech", I cannot let such an aside go
unnoticed. The fact that the court held open even the slightest possibility of recognizing
such welfare rights is startling. Now that the judges have opened the door only an inch,
they should not be allowed to shut it without giving a full accounting of themselves. Like
any political institution, the courts should be held to their word. A judicial failure of
progressive nerve will only show the courts' commitment to act on behalf of the disadvan-
taged to be a hollow gesture. On the other hand, a resounding confirmation of such
welfare rights will be cause for celebration. Socially-minded lawyers should be quick to
put these vague judicial commitments to the practical test. Which road is it that is paved
with good intentions?
56 See R v. Oakes (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 and R. v. Edwards
Books andArt Ltd. (1986), 35 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
57 Irwin Toy, supra, footnote 50, at p. 620.
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insisted that freedom of expression should only be suppressed in
urgent and compelling circumstances. It was not satisfied that the
welfare of children was at risk or that the legislation was
sufficiently proportionate to the perceived harm. Drawing on
historical examples of religious and sexual intolerance, Justices
Beetz and McIntyre warned that "in this century we have seen
whole societies utterly corrupted by the suppression of free
expression. '58 While this concern is to be taken seriously, it is
surely over-stated and trivialized when it is remembered that the
cause of religious and sexual freedom is surely much more pressing
and deserving of solicitude than the protection of Big Mac
commercials and Masters of the Universe endorsements.
The most troubling aspect of the decision is that, after a
thorough reading of both judgments, there is no obvious reason
why this particular legislation was saved. Indeed, Irwin Toy offers
no real guidance on how the court might deal with future attempts
at the legislative regulation of advertising. The test established by
the court under s. 1 is woefully vague and indeterminate; it is more
a conceptual curtain behind which the political dancing can take
place than a choreographic script for the direction of such moves. 59
Nevertheless, the fact that the legal action must now take place
around the s. 1 venue does hold significant implications for future
constitutional contretemps. This doctrinal leaning not only
insulates corporations from democratic regulation in the public
interest, but enables them to set the terms for and dominate any
debate over the public interest in such regulation. In arguments
over the merit of advertising about particular goods and services,
the hand of corporations has been strengthened and that of legis-
lative representatives proportionately weakened. In an area
where proof cannot be scientific and the issue is as much about
values as empirical evidence, any doubts will be resolved in favour
of the commercial interests.
For instance, a challenge to the Tobacco Products Control Act's
ban on tobacco advertising and promotion looms large. It is
anyone's guess - but only the Supreme Court judges' personal
decision - what will be the fate of that enlightened legislation.
The corporations contend that such advertising is not intended to
58 Ibid., at p. 636.
59 For an account of s. l's indeterminacy, see P. Monahan, Politics and The Constitution
(1987), pp. 97-140.
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induce more smoking, but to facilitate brand selection. Under the
Irwin Toy doctrine, the onus is upon government to show that
smoking is dangerous to health and, more importantly, that this
will be effected by a decrease in advertising. Such matters are not
easily susceptible to proof on a strictly cause-and-effect basis,
especially in light of the relative imbalance of informational and
financial resources between government and tobacco corpora-
tions: the burden of non-persuasion in such matters can often be
decisive. Even if the government succeeds on that issue, the
corporations argue that a total ban is overbroad and that counter-
speech is a more acceptable response. An astronomical amount of
corporate money is spent on image advertising and there is no
obvious non-state body with sufficient incentive or wealth to fulfil
such a countervailing role. Moreover, the target audience is
largely a group of addicts. This means that modest health warnings
and any counter-promotional campaign are unlikely to be
successful. Accordingly, moral and economic considerations
suggest that a judicious paternalism is not only tolerable, but
required in a democratic society. The misguided principle of Irwin
Toy places the constitutionality of the Tobacco Products Control
Act in unnecessary doubt and gives the tobacco industry a chance,
however slim, of obtaining moral respectability and political legit-
imacy.
6. Democratic Dialogue
What would a non-liberal theory look like? What is the alter-
native to a liberal approach to free speech? Unfortunately, the
position of the "left" on free speech has never been entirely satis-
factory. Too often, it has allowed liberals to take the high ground
and presented its own position as a vulnerable combination of
moral ambivalence and political naii'et6. By countenancing a
dangerous romance with state regulation, it has raised the
Orwellian spectre of enforced dogma and official conformity.
Good intentions have proved insufficient to bridge the gap
between democratic ideals and practical realities. The major
difficulty has been the willingness to accept the liberal account of
the problem to be solved and to work within its limiting
framework: liberal start points inevitably lead to liberal end
results. Before the left can offer a viable theory of free speech, it
must vacate the liberal territory and rethink the problem from the
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ground up: the nature of "freedom" and "speech" must be
constructed afresh. In short, if there were a different and better
understanding of the mutually constituting dialectic between the
"individual" and discourse, there would be a different and better
understanding of free speech and the conditions for its realization.
The world, and our ideas about it, take on meaning within
historically specific modes of communication. A society's
resources for conversation determine not only the knowledge at its
disposal, but also its very ways of knowing. Consequently, the
need to understand dialogue - the discursive interactions
between individuals - as the crucible of social action in which
individuals mutually constitute and reconstitute themselves and
others is paramount. By accepting that dialogue is both the
producer and the product of interacting individuals, it becomes
apparent that the challenge is twofold: to ensure that the quality of
that dialogue is sufficiently open and fluid so that people might
confront each other in the routine practices of daily life as equal
participants and, also, that it is sufficiently shared and certain to
protect people from its unscrupulous manipulation. It is only by
establishing such conditions of face-to-face intimacy and engaging
in such dialogic encounters that we will reach and share satis-
factory knowledge and truths. Moreover, in striving to establish a
dialogic community, the prevailing circumstances of social power
will have to be recognized and rectified; conversation is inimical to
hierarchy.
In so far as we live by a telos, it will not be found in History or
the Human Condition, but will be created and criticized in our
shared efforts at mutual understanding and debate. Meaning and
normative standards will be available and real, but will hold no
claim to universal validity. A society constitutes its own
conception of rational argument rather than uncovers an
independent criterion of rationality. Appropriately, conversation
offers no objective foundations. Instead, each participant is bound
by their acceptance of the contingent, yet real, status of their own
conversation and their shared commitment to respect its dynamic.
Criticism can be intelligible, engaged, constructive and authori-
tative: "we are not left with a nothingness but with our affirmative
ability to speak about human things in a human voice." 6 We
60 Comell, "Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics" (1985), 133 U.
Penn. L. Rev. 291 at p. 378. See also Michelman, "Foreword: Traces of Self-
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define and transform others as we ourselves are reciprocally
defined and transformed by others. There is a profound
connection between conversation and who we, as participants in
that conversation, are and can be. Indeed, by its very nature, true
dialogue is always critical and challenging. The vision of a dialogic
community - "mutual understanding, respect, a willingness to
listen and to risk one's opinions and prejudices, a mutual seeking
of the correctness of what is said" 61 - is not abstract nor disem-
bodied, but can give concrete guidance to our practical lives. It
will, for example, oblige and empower people to wrest control of
responsible decision-making from the technical experts, like
lawyers and bureaucrats.
By adopting such a dialectical view of the relations between
language, social action and individual intentionality, attention
shifts from individuals to the circumstances of their dialogic and
constitutive interactions. Conversation and connection become
important and valuable in themselves and not simply as a means to
the personal end of self-expression: they are the pith and
substance of social life. Of course, in the same way that it must not
be overvalued, the liberal campaign for free speech ought not to
be undervalued; its solicitude for the interests of individual
speakers against unwarranted state interference is of great signifi-
cance. However, a continued resort to the precepts and founda-
tional premises of rights talk can only have reactionary effects and
results. Even those who want to interpret rights "as tools to
express and strengthen community" 62 fail to appreciate fully the
extent to which rights talk is a confining, individualistic and one-
dimensional mode of dialogic engagement. Legal adjudication is a
truncated conversation that assumes the existence of a correct
hermeneutic and operates within an institutional framework of
coercive and normative violence.
An alternative concern with the establishment of a dialogic
community focuses as much on the interactive conditions of
human development as on the interacting individuals. This
Government" (1986), 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 at p. 33. For an excellent introduction to the
epistemological implications of a dialogic ethic, see Anti-Foundationalism and Practical
Reasoning, E. Simpson, ed. (1987).
61 R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (1983), p. 163.
62 Minow. "Interpreting Rights" (1986), 96 Yale L. J. 1860 at p. 1862. See also M.S. Ball,
Lying Down Together: Law, Metaphor and Theology (1985) and J.B. White, When
Words Lose Their Meaning (1984).
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permits the individualistic notion of freedom of speech to be
replaced by a more solidatristic understanding in which freedom
becomes a facilitation and mediation of engaged conversations.
63
Within such an ethic, people are recognized as being socially
situated, but not socially saturated. Freedom is no longer
associated with a lack of constraint. There is never a situation of
"no constraints", only an historical dialectic of openings and
closings: the issue is which constraints, not whether some or none.
The individual does not precede social encounters, but takes on
substance within them. Freedom does not stand in opposition to
community, but only exists within communities. Social worth and
self-esteem are embedded in and nourished by affective affilia-
tions; "solidarity is the social side of love." '64 To live in a
community is not to experience life as a forced march in strict
formation; that is one conception of community, but it is not the
only or best one. In place of order, rank and stability, there must
be a fluid, participatory and egalitarian vision of community in
which conflict and disagreement are facilitative of its enduring
value. 65 Such a vision will embrace difference as a celebration of
individuality and avoid a stultifying levelling that legislates a
homogeneous "other" against which people are encouraged to
define and measure themselves.
A progressive vision of community eschews a debilitating
anomy and a chilling sameness. It explores and inhabits the neg-
lected spaces of intersubjective relations. By thinking about and
63 In advocating this dialogic politics, there are obviously close comparisons to Jurgen
Habermas' "ideal-speech situation" and Richard Rorty's "continuing conversation of
mankind". See J. Habermas, Toward A Rational Society (1971); Legitimation Crisis
(1976); and R. Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror Of Nature (1979). However, there are
very significant differences between my position and their's. Mine is more self-
consciously political and materialist in design and ambition. I envisage a much greater
contextualization of conversation so that actual people speak in specific situations,
address the politics of their socio-historical situation and give tangible meaning to
democracy in their own lives. For a first cut at articulating and defending these similar-
ities and differences, see Hutchinson, "The Three 'R's: Reading/Rorty/Radically"
(1989), 103 Harv. L. Rev. 555.
64 R. Unger, Law in Modem Society (1976), p. 206.
65 For a succinct account of this divergence, see Parker, "Issues of Community and
Liberty" (1986), 8 Harv. J. Law & Publ. Pol. 287. In this sense, I plead guilty to Chris
McCrudden's charge that I am an advocate of "non-hierarchical constitutive communi-
tarianism". See McCrudden, "Community and Discrimination" in Oxford Essays in
Jurisprudence, J. Eekelaar and J. Bell, eds. (1987), at p. 224. This could only be an
indictable offence under a liberal regime of jurisprudence and, as such, my work is
committed as an act of civil disobedience.
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understanding our personal and social lives as complex and
overlapping accumulations of such relations, we might be better
able to effect a proper accomplishment of the democratic ideal.
An acceptance of intersubjectivity helps us to come to terms with
our vulnerability to and dependence on others as well as our
commitment to and responsibility for others. By viewing the
individual self as constituted in and through its intersubjective
connections, the notions of autonomy and solidarity can be better
and differently understood: criticism and commitment, innovation
and connection can be mutually supported. At the heart of this
enterprise is the understanding that self-definition is a function of
intersubjective experience; it is the relation and not the relating
entities that should be protected and nurtured. As Carol Gilligan
puts it, "a world comprised of relationships rather than of people
standing alone, a world that coheres through human
connection".66
By rethinking and reorienting free speech in this way and on
these revised epistemological premises, it becomes possible to go
beyond the predictable and stereotyped terms of contemporary
debate. A concern for dialogic authenticity cuts across a Dwork-
inian deontological preoccupation with speaker autonomy 67 and a
Meiklejohnian functional concentration on audience interests.
6s
While both concerns are important and must be respected by any
progressive proposal for change, a reliance on either as the
exclusive regulative ideal is ultimately self-defeating. Dialogue
turns us away from liberal notions of individual freedom, whether
singly or aggregately expressed, and points us toward the
democratic activities of associational individuals. By abandoning
the stale ethical vocabulary of means and ends, the formal condi-
tions for conversational encounters embody and inculcate a
substantive relationship between interlocutors that is important in
and for itself. Within such a dialogic community, freedom would
not be understood as a splendid but desolate isolation in which a
right to soliloquize might be the extent of freedom, or as a state-
enforced conformity in which the right to hear another's
monologue might exhaust freedom. In contrast, the regulative
66 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development
(1982), p. 29.
67 See R. Dworkin, supra, footnote 4, pp. 335-97.
68 See A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom (1965).
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ideal of dialogue incorporates people's claims to hear, be heard
and be answered. It establishes and maintains the social conditions
for open-ended, continuing and meaningful conversations in
which people engage as equals. In place of the traditional reliance
on individual rights to free speech, there might exist a set of
Ungerian-style social entitlements to open discourse. 69
Although a reliance on dialogue is richly suggestive in reorgan-
izing the doctrine and practice of "free speech", it is important
that it not be treated as an abstract ideal from which a series of pat
positions on the traditional range of hard cases can be logically
extrapolated. However, in contrast to the pseudo-exchanges of a
liberal democratic republic, 70 dialogue generates and reinforces its
own ethic. It not only offers a substantive measure for judging the
quality of political life, it also provides the means by which to
bridge the normative gap between general ideals and practical
application. Conversation is the embodiment of the procedural
and substantive goals that a democratic society can aspire to and
achieve; it improves and strengthens itself through constant
practice and usage. One crucial consequence of such a dialogic
understanding will be a reordering of the hard cases to be
confronted and resolved. There are no final or right answers, but
only different options whose exercise and appropriateness will
depend upon the particular problem and its socio-economic
context.
A commitment to "democratic conversation" requires a
changing and changeable mix of interventions and abstentions. It
eschews sweeping statements about, for instance, whether any
collectively sanctioned interference in media activities is
desirable. While a mandated entitlement of public access to large-
scale media outlets might be necessary, the universal availability
of access to fringe publications would be self-defeating. Access by
the powerful to the small presses of the relatively powerless
threatens to replicate the existing imbalance and to stymie the
development of a diversely democratic culture. Moreover, a
concern for dialogue obliges us to reconsider the meaning and
operation of "censorship". It forces an acknowledgment that
69 See R.M. Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of
Radical Democracy (1987), pp. 508-38. See also P. Chevigny, More Speech: Dialogue
Rights and Modern Liberty (1988).
70 See, for example, B. Ackerman, Social Justice in The Liberal State (1980).
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harm results not simply from the silencing of certain voices, but
also in allowing certain voices to dominate and operate a virtual
monologue. A fully developed "dialogic entitlement" would
combine active steps to bring in previously stilled voices and
positive moves to shut down prevailing stentorian voices. In all
cases, there would be a realistic. appreciation of the dialogic forum
being limited and finite in its economic and discursive dimensions.
The response that "the answer to bad speech is more speech" is
limited and simplistic. Dialogue demands more than the existence
of speech somewhere by someone, but a realistic opportunity to
have that speech heard and, preferably, responded to by others.
Democratic conversation requires an abandonment of the
public-private distinction. This does not mean that everything
becomes public and individuals lose all sense of privacy or
personal autonomy. The problematic that the distinction is
intended to address remains central to the critical enterprise.
What its abandonment does mean is that we will have to decide
democratically on those moments and activities when society at
large should devolve full power and authority to individuals and
establish a space in which they are immune from collective inter-
ference. This will not be a collective abdication of responsibility
for the fate of others, but will represent a constructive affirmation
of the need for everyone to be involved in providing a positive and
empowering freedom for each citizen. Nor will this devolution be
a once-and-for-all reckoning. It involves a continuing and evolving
responsibility to rework and realign these publicly created and
sustained occasions of privacy. It is as much a problem to oblit-
erate the distinction as it is to reify it. The challenge is to demystify
the distinction and recognize its artefactual character and liber-
atory potential; we must put it in service to democratic ideals
rather than remain servants to its counterfeit authority.
For instance, threats to the democratic ideal come from many
different sources. At times, government will be the problem and a
strong and "private" media will be the solution; the Spycatcher
debacle in England and the law lords' pathetic ruling is an obvious
example. 71 At other times, the media will be the problem and
government regulation will be the solution; the Gay Alliance affair
and the Supreme Court's pusillanimous judgment immediately
spring to mind.72 A self-conscious blend of "private" and "public"
71 Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers, [198711 W.L.R. 1248 (H.L.).
72 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun (1979), 97 D.L.R. (3d) 577, [19791 2
S.C.R. 435.
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initiatives is demanded rather than an unthinking and uncompro-
mising allegiance to one at the expense of the other. Such a
substantive and perpetual undertaking is the strength and not the
weakness of democratic politics. The state ought not to be in
opposition to the citizenry, but must become an institutional
venue through which citizens struggle to achieve a common good.
In a democracy, there is more than dialogue between the state and
its citizens. When government speaks, it ought to be the rever-
berated outcome of the democratic conversation between citizens.
7. Lasting Words
The bitter irony of democracy's stunted practice is that it has
been brought about and justified in the name of greater individual
freedom. Whatever its good intentions, liberalism has been
ambushed by the privileged and political debate has begun to be
held to corporate ransom. The advertisements reproduced below
testify to the moral bankruptcy of free speech's liberal tradition.
While each of them illustrates the corrupting and controlling
influence of corporate power, the fact is that the censorial actions
of Pepsi and the radio stations are clearly justified by that very
same tradition of free speech that the advertisers seek to invoke
against them. Under a liberal understanding, Pepsi and the radio
stations are merely exercising their constitutional freedom to
choose when to speak and what to say. Similarly, the Anti-
Censorship Project and the Molson Workers come to be treated as
being themselves in the business of censorship and the curtailment
of free speech. Such a state of affairs is to be deplored.
1990]
32 Canadian Business Law Journal [Vol. 17
Boycott Pepsi!
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by Richard Yao, Esq.
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To counter this degradation of the democratic ideal, there must
be asserted a collective commitment to the enhancement of
dialogue as the activity par excellence through which people
constitute and reconstitute themselves. A thoroughgoing
discussion of "free speech" is an important place to begin. This
especially includes the belated acceptance that its resolution is not
a technical matter of legal principle, but an ideological struggle
over the kind of society and individuals that people want to be. As
such, it cannot be entrusted to the participants in the judicial
forum. Furthermore, although talk alone will not set the world to
rights and wholesale socio-economic redistribution will be
necessary, a commitment to democratic dialogue is as good a place
as any from which to commence that daunting, but vital task.
Dialogue is not simply a pre-condition for the building of the good
community, but is an integral part of the democratic good life.
Although I have run the risk of imitating the moth and liberal
scholars, I hope that, by approaching free speech from a different
angle and imagining a different light, I will avoid their fate. It
would take much more space and time than is available in this
essay to pursue the implications of "democratic dialogue" and to
demonstrate its transformative potential. Accordingly, the limited
aim of this essay has been to expose the general shortcomings of
liberal theory that both inform and ultimately invalidate the
continuing debate over commercial speech. In a community
committed to democratic dialogue, corporations and other institu-
tions will have to be stopped from talking at people. Instead,
people will have to be encouraged to talk with one another. In
working toward the social and material conditions for such conver-
sation, much will have to be confronted and altered that is inimical
to a truly just and egalitarian society. In so doing, people will learn
that conversation and debate are not only some of the great
pleasures of the good life, but that they are also its necessities. As
Michael Ignatieff so passionately and pertinently concludes: 73
We need justice, we need liberty, and we need as much solidarity as can be
reconciled with justice and liberty. But we also need, as much as anything
else, language adequate to the times we live in .... Our needs are made of
words: they come to us in speech, and they can die for lack of expression.
Without a public language to help us find our own words, our needs will dry
up in silence ... . Without the light of language, we risk becoming strangers
to our better selves.
73 M. Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers (1984), pp. 141-2.
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